



## Security Council

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### Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti

#### I. Introduction

1. The present report is submitted pursuant to Security Council resolution 1542 (2004) of 30 April 2004, by which the mandate of the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) was established, and resolution 1608 (2005) of 22 June 2005, by which its mandate was extended until 15 February 2006. It covers major developments from the issuance of my report of 13 May 2005 (S/2005/313) up to 29 September, with particular attention to those issues identified in resolution 1608 (2005).

#### II. Political aspects

2. During the reporting period, the Transitional Government and MINUSTAH were confronted with serious political and security challenges. Despite these challenges, the electoral process gained momentum. The registration of parties, candidates and voters has encompassed a relatively wide range of Haitian political opinion, thus enhancing the credibility of the electoral process and the possibilities for a broad debate regarding the future of Haiti. However, there are substantial technical impediments to the smooth running of this process, and the political dialogue remains at a nascent level.

##### A. Political developments

3. The Transitional Government continued to face serious challenges in key areas, such as security, human rights and living conditions, and was confronted with criticism from several sectors of society. In response, Prime Minister Gérard Latortue organized a series of closed meetings with political leaders and the private sector to develop a strategy to combat armed gang violence and strengthen confidence in the Transitional Government and the electoral process. In addition, on 25 June the Council of Eminent Persons presented to the Transitional Government a road map outlining priorities for a successful continuation of the transition: public security, justice, elections, political governance and economic measures.

4. Following months of controversy over the growing sense of insecurity as well as the handling of the detention of high-profile figures associated with Fanmi Lavalas, in particular former Prime Minister Yvon Neptune, the Minister of Justice and Public Security resigned on 14 June. A new cabinet was inaugurated on 22 June, with new Ministers of Justice and Public Security, Interior and Social Affairs. Subsequently, a new Director General of the Haitian National Police was appointed on 18 July.

5. In spite of the Transitional Government's efforts, State institutions remained generally weak. Lack of resources continued to hinder the local authorities in the discharge of their functions, with negative effects on the State's credibility. In some areas, disbanded local authorities remained in place contrary to the Ministry of the Interior's instructions (see S/2005/313, para. 28).

6. Political tensions, as well as security concerns, reached a high point when the well-known journalist and poet Jacques Roche, who had been kidnapped four days earlier, was found murdered on 14 July. Some government officials, as well as the Council of Eminent Persons, condemned the killing in public statements which were widely interpreted as accusations that Fanmi Lavalas members had been involved in the murder and calling for the banning of Fanmi Lavalas. Investigations by MINUSTAH and the Haitian National Police into the kidnapping and subsequent murder suggested that the crime was politically motivated, but could not conclusively establish responsibility.

7. The appearance of Father Gérard Jean-Juste, a Lavalas activist, at Mr. Roche's funeral on 21 July provoked a strong reaction from the crowd. To ensure his protection, he was taken by MINUSTAH to a police station. There he was later arrested and charged by an examining magistrate with participating in the kidnapping and murder of Mr. Roche. On 31 August he was transferred to the annex of the National Penitentiary, where Mr. Neptune and former Interior Minister Jocelerme Privert remain imprisoned, with MINUSTAH monitoring their detention and ensuring security.

8. Political parties have become increasingly active in the lead-up to the elections. MINUSTAH organized a series of meetings of political parties in order to create a positive environment for the electoral process. The first of those meetings, held on 11 and 12 May, brought together 36 party leaders, who discussed issues of governance, the transitional process and prolonged pretrial detention. On 17 May leaders of 34 political parties signed the "Port-au-Prince declaration against corruption", which calls for the development of an ethical code of conduct for political parties. The signatories also committed themselves to conducting an open and honest electoral campaign and establishing a parliamentary commission on corruption at the next session of Parliament.

9. A further step was taken on 14 June, when 17 political parties, including sectors of Fanmi Lavalas, signed an electoral code of conduct that bars the use of violence in the pursuit of political power. On 25 and 26 July, MINUSTAH, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the Transitional Government organized a workshop for some 60 political leaders, at which key governance issues were discussed.

10. MINUSTAH also promoted the participation of women in the electoral process. From 3 to 8 July, MINUSTAH organized a training session on the theme

“Women and leadership” for potential female candidates in the forthcoming elections. On 25 August MINUSTAH, together with a local non-governmental organization, launched a weekly radio programme with a view to raising the awareness of female candidates and voters alike.

11. Under the auspices of the Institut supérieur de formation politique et sociale, and with the support of the Government of Norway, 12 political parties signed on 27 September a pacte de stabilité et de gouvernabilité. The agreement commits its signatories to cooperating before and after the elections, with a view to ensuring that key tasks are undertaken in a spirit of collaboration.

12. The national dialogue process proceeded slowly during the reporting period. The identification of the members of the technical secretariat and the steering committee of the national dialogue by the 12-member Preparatory Commission continued. The Commission held a number of meetings with various sectors of society and political parties, as well as the international community, to discuss the mechanism and process for the national dialogue. A number of political parties have taken the initiative to identify individuals as candidates for the steering committee.

## **B. Election preparations**

13. In a change from previously envisaged dates, the Provisional Electoral Council announced in early September that the legislative and presidential elections would take place on 20 November and 3 January (first and second round, respectively) and the local and municipal elections on 11 December. However, this calendar has not yet been promulgated by the Transitional Government and its feasibility has been publicly contested. Prime Minister Latortue requested the Provisional Electoral Council to review this calendar, with the support of MINUSTAH, bearing in mind respect for the constitutional requirement to swear in the President on 7 February 2006, and to make changes if needed.

14. After initial difficulties, considerable progress has been made in the registration of voters, in which the Organization of American States (OAS) is taking a lead role. As at 29 September, over 2.9 million people, or more than 70 per cent of the estimated 4 million eligible voters, had registered. Deadlines for registration have been extended four times, most recently until 30 September. OAS, with the support of MINUSTAH, has established 450 registration sites throughout the country, including several mobile ones.

15. The registrations of 45 political parties and 32 presidential candidates, representing a wide spectrum of political tendencies, were approved by the Provisional Electoral Council. One of the approved presidential candidates, Marc Bazin, represents an electoral coalition of a large sector of Fanmi Lavalas and his own party; in addition, another approved candidate, former President René Préval, comes from a Lavalas background. This has significantly increased the likelihood of inclusive elections.

16. Ten potential candidates whose applications were rejected by the Provisional Electoral Council have filed legal claims contesting that decision; among them are Gerard Gilles of Fanmi Lavalas and former Prime Minister Jean-Marie Chérestal, who comes from a Lavalas background.

17. The legislative framework for the electoral process remains inadequate. Despite the advice of MINUSTAH, the Transitional Government has not yet made necessary changes to the 11 February electoral decree (see S/2005/124, para. 28). In addition, it remains difficult to ensure that the political process is not tainted by candidates who are widely held by the public to be criminals or closely linked to gangs or criminal violence. This situation is exacerbated by the suspicion that electoral campaigns are being financed, at least in part, by funds of dubious origin. It is important that Haitian institutions address this matter seriously.

18. Furthermore, the ability of the Provisional Electoral Council to organize and administer the elections in a timely manner remained an issue. Electoral preparations continued at a slower pace than anticipated, and a number of significant technical difficulties lie ahead. Even though the Provisional Electoral Council executive board was re-established on 9 August 2005, the institution continued to suffer from severe structural and operational shortcomings, which have cast serious doubts on its ability to establish its full secretariat and meet crucial deadlines. The delay in determining the location and number of polling stations, coupled with the late adoption of the electoral calendar, prevented the completion of the logistical and security plans for the elections.

19. In this context, MINUSTAH and OAS identified 10 key decisions and actions to be taken urgently by the Haitian authorities. These include providing the Provisional Electoral Council with an effective executive structure and professional staff in and outside of Port-au-Prince; confirming the electoral calendar and implementing the legally required steps on time; revising the electoral decree, as noted above; and determining the location and number of polling sites. To date, none of these measures has been fully implemented by the national authorities. In order to ensure that the elections are held on time, it is imperative that the capacity of the Provisional Electoral Council to take prompt and suitable decisions be strengthened. Nevertheless, given the failure so far of the national authorities to implement the 10 priority measures, MINUSTAH may need to play a more active role in the electoral process and provide logistical and operational support beyond what had been originally envisaged. In that event, MINUSTAH would need additional resources.

20. The funding shortfall for the elections currently stands at \$4.1 million, out of a \$60.7 million budget, due to insufficient contributions and currency fluctuations affecting contributions made in euros. The extension of the voter registration period, and changes in the electoral timetable, will further increase the budget.

21. International and local electoral observation will be a key factor in preventing, reporting and correcting irregularities. During the reporting period, a number of international organizations and countries expressed their willingness to deploy electoral observers, and some have already started deployment. It should be noted that the operational requirements of the electoral process will limit the ability of MINUSTAH to provide logistical and security assistance to the observers, and that bilateral assistance will be required.

### **III. Security aspects**

22. Over the reporting period, there have been improvements in the security environment in Haiti. However, the potential for a resurgence of violence remains,

and continued preparedness will be crucial, particularly during the electoral period, if the gains that have been made are not to be reversed. Meanwhile, it will be essential to continue efforts to advance the development of Haiti's rule-of-law capabilities. The establishment of the Joint Mission Analysis Cell has enabled MINUSTAH to considerably increase its capacity to analyse and share information throughout the Mission. However, MINUSTAH continued to lack access to reliable tactical intelligence.

## **A. Security environment and activities**

23. The security situation in most parts of the country remained fragile but generally stable, with few incidents reported. However, in Port-au-Prince, a marked rise in violence and criminality, including kidnappings, generated serious public anxiety in May and June. In response to this wave of violence, MINUSTAH and the Haitian National Police mounted several successful operations to rescue abductees, and a significant number of suspected kidnappers have been arrested. Military and police operations, along with targeted moves against gang leaders, have been increased in districts affected by gang violence.

24. On 1 June, a group of armed men conducted an arson attack against the main marketplace in Port-au-Prince, Tête Bœuf, leaving up to 17 people dead and causing extensive damage. During June, 59 kidnappings were known to have taken place in Port-au-Prince, with 42 in July, 38 in August and 21 from 1 to 27 September. There is no clear pattern of either motivation or choice of victim, and citizens of all social and economic backgrounds have been targeted.

25. On 6 July, MINUSTAH conducted a large-scale operation in Cité Soleil aimed at apprehending and bringing to justice a prominent gang leader, Emmanuel Wilmer. MINUSTAH encountered heavy gunfire, and it is believed that Wilmer was killed during the operation, together with four of his associates. While MINUSTAH took precautions to avoid civilian casualties, given the densely populated urban nature of the terrain, civilians appear to have been caught in the crossfire. Reports of civilian casualties could not be verified by MINUSTAH due to the strength of the armed response by Wilmer's associates, which forced MINUSTAH troops to withdraw from the area. There were unconfirmed but numerous reports from the Haitian National Police and other sources that gangs were seen killing civilians following the operation. MINUSTAH's Joint Special Investigation Unit is investigating these acts of reprisal, as well as allegations of excessive use of force by MINUSTAH. The prevailing fragile security situation in Cité Soleil has complicated the investigation.

26. In contrast, the security situation in Bel-Air, another hot spot, has improved significantly. In July MINUSTAH established a permanent security presence and subsequently reopened Haitian National Police community stations in the area. Armed gangs have effectively been expelled from Bel-Air, where, after a long period of lawlessness, the situation has begun to normalize.

27. It is important that these security operations and similar efforts in the future be followed by rapid and effective relief assistance and development projects, as well as an expansion of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration activities. Such efforts continued to be hampered, however, by the fact that there are relatively few implementing partners in a position to operate in the area, the limited number of

government staff available and a security situation that limits mobility, particularly in and around Cité Soleil.

28. With the deployment of a battalion from Jordan and a company from Sri Lanka, both of which will be operational in October, the military component of MINUSTAH will be only one company short of its authorized strength under Security Council resolution 1608 (2005). A new sector headquarters for Port-au-Prince is being established to enable MINUSTAH to enhance its operational capabilities and establish a permanent security presence in the area of Cité Soleil.

29. The deployment of MINUSTAH police is being adjusted to maximize resources oriented towards the electoral process. The police component was reinforced in August with the deployment of an 85-strong formed police unit from Senegal. An eighth formed police unit from Nigeria is expected to be deployed in October. Efforts are also under way to identify the remaining individual police officers, giving priority to francophone officers whenever possible.

30. Haiti is a transit point for illegal drugs and weapons. The illegal activities associated with this trade undermine the political, social and economic fabric of the country. Bilateral assistance will be crucial to reducing this threat. In addition, MINUSTAH is currently assessing the need for specialized observation aircraft to conduct surveillance and patrolling operations in the generally inaccessible land border and coastal areas.

## **B. Electoral security**

31. On 27 September, a group of seven armed individuals entered the registration centre in Savanette in the Central province and stole equipment from the premises. Otherwise, only minor security incidents had affected the election process directly since the launching of voter registration on 25 April. These included incidents related to long lines at registration centres, minor assaults on individual electoral guards and theft and destruction of equipment. However, the potential for violence may increase during the campaign period, and this will be addressed in MINUSTAH planning.

32. MINUSTAH has developed an electoral security plan defining responsibilities and security arrangements on election days and the preceding days. Integrated United Nations teams within the regions will play a coordinating role under the overall authority of an integrated election-monitoring centre. The increased military and police capacities available to MINUSTAH will be in addition to those of the Haitian National Police and 3,600 local electoral security assistants (see S/2005/313, para. 10). Nevertheless, it is clear that the electoral period may be tense and that security capacities in the country will be stretched to the maximum.

## **C. Disarmament, demobilization and reintegration**

33. The threat posed by members of the former military diminished during the reporting period, following the death on 9 April of self-proclaimed leader Ravix Rémissainthe (see S/2005/313, para. 16). MINUSTAH continued to make efforts to persuade groups of former soldiers to disarm voluntarily, although no progress has been made. Former military personnel continued to be primarily interested in

payments and pensions from the Transitional Government and public-sector jobs, particularly within the Haitian National Police or a reconstituted army. With regard to indemnity payments, the Demobilized Soldiers' Management Bureau, established by the Transitional Government, announced that it had made the first of three payments to 90 per cent of former soldiers, but that the resources for further payments had not yet been secured.

34. MINUSTAH increased contacts with elements close to other armed groups. Several rounds of negotiations were held in Port-au-Prince slums and locations outside the capital city. Hope for a possible breakthrough in Bel-Air arose following the operation in Cité Soleil on 6 July, when several community leaders told MINUSTAH that armed group members were ready to disarm. However, it turned out that many are reluctant to do so unless they are assured that they will not be attacked by the Haitian National Police or rival armed gangs. The National Commission on Disarmament, with the assistance of MINUSTAH, is devising a clear *modus operandi* for negotiating detailed criteria for eligibility for disarmament, demobilization and reintegration.

35. In the meantime, MINUSTAH and UNDP have begun to implement community-based projects aimed at increasing alternative livelihood options, thus reducing violence in the slums, and investing in capacity-building for the reinsertion of former armed delinquents. In addition, MINUSTAH and UNDP are developing a database that will help to manage the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration process by monitoring firearms and the situation of reintegrated individuals. It will also lay a foundation for an effective firearms-control mechanism, which could help the authorities to manage weapon possession.

#### **D. Rule of law**

36. The lack of strong and professional rule-of-law institutions remained one of the biggest challenges facing Haiti. Of particular concern was the pattern of alleged serious misconduct of Haitian National Police officers, including their alleged involvement in the summary execution of at least nine individuals on 20 August at a football game in the Martissant area of Port-au-Prince. MINUSTAH is conducting its own investigation and supporting the efforts of the national police to investigate the incident. MINUSTAH has produced a preliminary report on the incident, which has been given to the General Inspectorate of the Haitian National Police.

37. MINUSTAH is assisting the Haitian National Police in developing a reform plan, on the basis of a memorandum of understanding between the Haitian authorities and the Mission, which will seek to enhance both professionalism and technical skills and will cover vetting and certification of police officers. As a first step, MINUSTAH and the Haitian National Police commenced the provisional registration of national police officers with a pilot project in Jacmel in early September; as at 29 September, 209 officers and 158 weapons had been registered.

38. On 20 September, 778 officers completed their training at the Police Academy. Of these, 35 were women and 148 former members of the military. A new curriculum has been established with the support of MINUSTAH. It includes elements relating to child protection and HIV sensitization. Since March 2004, 1,546 officers have graduated from the academy. The formal curriculum is supplemented by guidance in the field from over 410 co-located MINUSTAH police

officers, who accompany and provide operational support to Haitian National Police officers in their daily activities, as well as specialist in-service training at 46 national police stations.

39. The judicial system continues to suffer from serious technical deficiencies, which undermine public confidence. The prolonged detention of former Prime Minister Yvon Neptune, whose committal to trial order was recently published, was widely perceived as symptomatic of the interference of political actors in the functioning of the judicial system. In addition, the recent release of Louis Jodel Chamblain, second-in-command of the paramilitary group known as the Front révolutionnaire pour l'avancement et le progrès d'Haiti, convicted in absentia and sentenced for his involvement in various crimes in 1993 and 1994, tarnished the credibility of the justice system.

40. Over the past month and a half, some preliminary attempts were made by the Haitian authorities to address administration of justice and detention issues. The Minister of Justice published a workplan for the second half of 2005 that refers to 12 areas prioritized for action. President Boniface Alexandre and the Minister of Justice both expressed their support for the adoption of decrees on the independence of the judges. Two draft decrees are currently being reviewed regarding the statute of the School of Magistrates and the Superior Council of Magistrates. In addition, the Transitional Government established an ad hoc national commission to deal with prolonged pretrial issues, as well as a detention review commission in Port-au-Prince; it also initiated the refurbishment of prisons in Hinche and Mirebalais and launched the first jury trials in two years in Gonaïves, Hinche, Les Cayes and Fort-Liberté.

41. MINUSTAH is preparing a set of recommendations on how the Mission and the wider international community could assist in strengthening the Haitian judicial and correctional systems, on the basis of, inter alia, the findings of a criminal justice advisory team that was deployed in June. These recommendations will draw from the lessons learned from prior engagements in Haiti, including the need for a balanced approach to strengthen the police, judicial and corrections institutions in parallel.

#### **IV. Human rights**

42. Respect for the human rights of the Haitian population continued to be compromised by a mixture of criminal violence and the institutional deficiencies noted above. MINUSTAH is working to develop local capacities, including by training and advising local human rights organizations, while continuing to monitor human rights on the ground.

43. In pursuance of these goals, MINUSTAH documented widespread cases of unlawful arrests, ill-treatment and prolonged pretrial detention. In July 2005, 93 per cent of detainees were in pretrial detention, and the figure could now be even higher. While Haitian National Police operations increased towards the end of the reporting period, police and judicial authorities have failed to date to complete the investigations needed to obtain proper warrants and arraign, indict and prosecute suspected criminals. MINUSTAH received credible reports of elements of the Haitian National Police having been involved in a number of summary executions, including the Martissant killings referred to above, as well as in other acts of



banditry and violence. During the past three months, at least four cases of alleged summary executions have been investigated by the MINUSTAH Joint Special Investigation Unit. Furthermore, in some instances where police officers were found to have been involved in flagrant cases of misconduct, disciplinary measures that were taken served to protect them from formal inquiry and judicial prosecution. The Conseil supérieur de la police nationale has agreed to the establishment of a joint commission to investigate human rights abuses. MINUSTAH police are currently working on an implementation strategy.

44. In general, the daily lives of residents of Port-au-Prince city centre and its densely populated slums continued to be disrupted by frequent acts of violence, sexual assault, extortion, harassment and intimidation by armed gangs. Reportedly, kidnapers increasingly subject their captives to torture, rape and other forms of ill-treatment. Victims have come from all sectors of society and include a number of children.

45. In addition, MINUSTAH documented the killing of children in Cité Soleil and other poor districts during exchanges of fire between gangs and the Haitian National Police, and the continued use of sexual violence against children. During visits to the detention facilities of the Judicial Police on 2 July 2005, MINUSTAH found three cases of alleged torture against children held there.

46. To address the problem of alleged violations of children's rights by the Haitian National Police, MINUSTAH signed an agreement with the national police for the provision of comprehensive child-protection training for all new police recruits. All 778 newly trained members of the Haitian National Police participated in such courses. Furthermore, a joint nationwide awareness campaign against all forms of violence against children, including sexual abuse and child prostitution, was launched in collaboration with the Haitian Coalition for Child Rights.

## **V. Humanitarian situation and development**

47. Alongside MINUSTAH efforts to address political, security and human rights issues, the international community continues to play a key role in responding to humanitarian and development needs, which must be met if Haiti is to achieve lasting stability. The installation of a new administration early next year may bring unrealistic expectations. It will be particularly important, during the period after the elections, that international support focus on employment-generation and translate into high-visibility projects.

### **A. Humanitarian situation**

48. Two hurricanes, Dennis and Emily, have hit Haiti so far during the 2005 hurricane season. Together they killed 32 people and damaged 15 schools, 400 houses, 3 water-supply systems and 1 bridge on the southern peninsula. In some areas, agricultural loss is estimated at 20 to 25 per cent of the new harvest, exacerbating the effects of the drought earlier this year, which had already reduced agricultural output by more than 50 per cent in the most seriously affected areas (see S/2005/313, para. 36). Besides assisting during the relief efforts, MINUSTAH and United Nations agencies focused on increasing disaster preparedness in the country.

In this area, UNDP assisted in the preparation of a national action plan and the organization of two hurricane-oriented simulation exercises to test the national and United Nations coordination mechanisms. These preparations allowed for better coordination of inter-agency efforts during the two storms.

49. Violence continued to hamper the work of the humanitarian community in the slums of Port-au-Prince. Despite the difficult working conditions, the United Nations system and NGOs have implemented or continue to implement 47 projects in water and sanitation, education, infrastructure, health, human rights, gender, employment-generation, and disarmament, demobilization and reintegration.

## **B. Development, the Interim Cooperation Framework and quick-impact projects**

50. The socio-political crisis continues to have a negative effect on Haiti's economic situation. Further implementation of the Interim Cooperation Framework (see S/2004/698, para. 25) and the economic recovery programme, as well as the emergency post-conflict assistance programme, helped to partially address economic imbalances. The increase in the price of oil and poor productive capacity, as well as the natural disasters which affected the country in 2004, were the key factors preventing economic recovery in 2005. The Transitional Government took a number of positive measures in the area of public finance, with a view to fighting corruption and smuggling, which helped to contain inflation and to stabilize the local currency. Nonetheless, human needs related to public health services, education, safe drinking water, security, justice and public infrastructure, remained pressing. Only 5 per cent of the 3,202 kilometres of national road network is considered to be of good quality.

51. The Transitional Government reported improvements in the disbursement of funds pledged under the Interim Cooperation Framework since May. Overall disbursement has increased by 19 per cent and is now on target with initial 2004-2005 projections of close to \$500 million. Forty-five per cent of the disbursement has been for support of access to basic services, 10 per cent for economic recovery, 20 per cent for economic governance, 13 per cent for political governance and 12 per cent for budgetary aid, arrears and unallocated funds. The Transitional Government expressed its confidence that future disbursement will respect projected financial targets in 2005-2006. At a conference in Montreal on international assistance to Haiti on 16 and 17 June, the donor community reiterated its firm commitment to long-term support for the country and acknowledged the Transitional Government's appeal to enhance assistance in the areas of law and order, energy, rapid employment-generation and preparations for the new academic year.

52. The World Food Programme (WFP) continues its activities for the feeding of some 330,000 primary and secondary schoolchildren in the most insecure areas in the north, north-east, west and Artibonite. A national campaign by the Ministry of Health and Education, actively supported by WFP, treated some 700,000 schoolchildren for parasitic infections and provided training to more than 16,000 teachers and health workers. In May, WFP launched a new protracted relief and recovery operation, which will provide nutritional education and food assistance to 550,000 malnourished children, pregnant and nursing women, and people living with HIV/AIDS and tuberculosis. The United Nations Children's Fund and the

United Nations Population Fund launched a joint five-year programme to tackle the acute level of maternal mortality, aiming to reach out to 1 million women in the three northern and central provinces of Haiti.

53. During the fiscal year 2004-2005, MINUSTAH approved 98 quick-impact projects amounting to \$969,873. The programme has benefited the populations of all 10 regions, covering areas such as agriculture, education, the environment, health, HIV/AIDS, human rights, gender, emergency relief, infrastructure rehabilitation, water and sanitation, and civic education. Forty quick-impact projects have been fully completed, with the remainder at varying stages of implementation. MINUSTAH has decentralized the programme for the fiscal year 2005-2006, empowering the regional offices to assess requests and make decisions, thus making the programme more responsive.

## **VI. Mission support**

54. The MINUSTAH integrated Mission headquarters was fully established on 27 June. The renovations and move of Mission components to the headquarters has now almost been completed. As at 20 July, the planned integrated regional offices were operating throughout the country, and planning for support assistance for disarmament, demobilization and reintegration and the electoral process is progressing well. Suitable facilities for accommodating the additional formed police unit personnel, military troops and civilian police staff have been identified, and the required rehabilitation work is almost complete.

55. During the reporting period, MINUSTAH developed an implementation plan for its mandate, which details the respective roles of the various components of the Mission in achieving overall objectives. The plan is a tool to further improve intra-Mission coordination and integration efforts.

56. MINUSTAH continues to provide HIV/AIDS awareness training for its personnel. The initial training of 28 HIV counsellors took place in July 2005; voluntary counselling and testing services have now been launched for MINUSTAH personnel.

## **VII. Financial aspects**

57. By its resolution 59/17 B, the General Assembly appropriated an amount of \$494,887,000 (gross), equivalent to \$41,240,583 per month, for the MINUSTAH Special Account for the period from 1 July 2005 to 30 June 2006. Following the adoption of Security Council resolution 1608 (2005), a report containing a revised budget for the period 1 July 2005 to 30 June 2006, amounting to \$518,828,500, has been submitted to the Assembly for its review during the main part of its sixtieth session.

58. As at 31 July 2005, unpaid assessed contributions to the MINUSTAH Special Account amounted to \$331.7 million. The total outstanding assessed contributions for all peacekeeping operations at that date amounted to \$2,557 million.

## VIII. Observations

59. Haiti is at a critical juncture. The prospects for a credible electoral process have been enhanced by the registration of a significant number of voters and the entry of candidates representing a broad range of political opinion. Progress has also been made in addressing urgent security threats. However, the gains that have been attained remain fragile, and there is a need for greater openness and improved decision-making in the electoral process. Other problems that need to be addressed include the existing technical problems in the electoral process, the possibility of increased violence during the campaign period and persisting impunity and disregard for human rights.

60. The primary responsibility for Haiti's recovery lies with the leadership of the country and its people. However, in order for Haiti to advance towards real stability and development, strong and sustained international support must be provided through MINUSTAH and through complementary and closely coordinated bilateral assistance. In this regard, the high level of commitment demonstrated by members of the Core Group on Haiti during the ministerial-level meeting that I convened on 17 September in New York, as well as during the recent high-level meeting of Latin American troop-contributing countries and the meeting of the Rio Group in Bariloche, Argentina, is encouraging.

61. The credibility of the elections will depend upon the confidence of candidates and their constituencies that the process is transparent and that a level playing field has been established. In this context, it is vital that the Transitional Government address without further delay the outstanding concerns regarding the electoral law and take measures to facilitate inclusive and participatory elections. It is essential to avoid any perception that the judicial process is being used in a way that could adversely affect political participation. The provision of public financing to political parties would help reduce the risk of reliance upon dubious sources of funding. The leaders of political parties, working together with the Transitional Government and civil society, should seek to reach out and build cooperation across party lines.

62. The 10 priority actions identified by MINUSTAH and OAS to overcome key technical and organizational challenges in the electoral process need to be taken urgently, and in particular the institutional capacity of the Provisional Electoral Council needs to be strengthened as a matter of priority. At the same time, the international community should stand ready to play a greater role in the organization of the electoral process to ensure its success. Such a role would require a commensurate short-term increase in resources for MINUSTAH.

63. The substantial financial support pledged by bilateral donors for the organization of the elections is appreciated. It is now urgent that pledges be fully disbursed and that the necessary resources be made available to cover the entire cost of the electoral process.

64. Despite recent improvements in the security situation and the success of large-scale joint security operations, more needs to be done to maintain pressure on illegal armed groups. Security operations should be accompanied by humanitarian and development assistance, for which the necessary resources should be provided in a timely manner. Bilateral donor assistance will also be required to permit a meaningful response to the security threats posed by drug and weapon flows.

65. Given the possible increase in tensions during the next phase of the electoral process, a useful message of reassurance and deterrence could be provided if one or more Member States indicated their readiness to back up the capabilities of MINUSTAH through the deployment, if required, of an offshore presence during this period.

66. The strengthening of Haiti's rule-of-law institutions, including reform of the Haitian National Police, is essential for the effective maintenance of internal stability and the extension of State authority. The need for reform of the Haitian National Police has been reinforced by recent, deeply disturbing reports of the involvement of some of its officers in serious crimes and human rights violations. However, there have been marked improvements in the level of cooperation and in the attitude of the Haitian national police leadership. The full commitment of the Haitian authorities to end impunity and develop professional values will be crucial for reform to proceed. Likewise, generous and sustained contributions from the international community, provided in close coordination with MINUSTAH and with the vetting and certification process, will be essential.

67. The reform of the police must be carried out in parallel with the improvement of the functioning of the judicial and penal systems in Haiti. Visible progress in these areas is vital for increasing public confidence in the viability of Haiti's future Government. The Transitional Government must make every effort to achieve progress on these reforms during the remainder of its mandate in order to provide a firm platform for the incoming elected Government.

68. It is also essential that the Haitian authorities work closely with MINUSTAH and the wider international community to strengthen the protection of human rights, end impunity and address cases of illegal, arbitrary and prolonged detention.

69. The administration that takes office after the elections will face important political, security and human rights challenges, while having limited technical capacity and few resources. Further significant assistance from the international community will remain indispensable, at least for the next few years.

70. The development of an effective strategy to assist Haiti will depend upon not only the political and security dimensions of stability being addressed, but also its social and economic aspects. Particularly during the period after the elections, unrealistic expectations could lead to instability. The generosity of donors will need to find tangible expression on the ground through labour-intensive projects that can help restore public confidence in the peacebuilding process. Donors will also need to support the central and local authorities, as well as to engage in longer-term poverty-reduction efforts.

71. I am grateful for the continuing engagement of those Member States contributing troops and police personnel to MINUSTAH, as well as to the members of the Core Group and to other organizations, agencies, contributors and donors for their support in the implementation of the MINUSTAH mandate. The lead role played by OAS in voter registration is particularly appreciated. Finally, I should like to pay tribute to my Special Representative, Juan Gabriel Valdés, and to the military, police and civilian personnel of MINUSTAH for their dedication and work in promoting peace and stability in Haiti.

## Annex I

**United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti: countries providing military staff and contingents (as at 29 September 2005)**

<i>Country</i>	<i>Staff officers</i>	<i>Troops</i>	<i>Total</i>
Argentina	10	547	557
Bolivia	4	—	4
Brazil <sup>a</sup>	20	1 199	1 219
Canada	3	—	3
Chile	9	534	543
Croatia	1	—	1
Ecuador	1	66	67
France	2	—	2
Guatemala	3	80	83
Jordan	9	861	870
Malaysia	1	—	1
Morocco	4	164	168
Nepal	6	750	756
Paraguay	3	—	3
Peru	5	202	207
Philippines	2	155	157
Spain	2	200	202
Sri Lanka	5	750	755
United States of America	4	—	4
Uruguay	7	771	778
Yemen	1	—	1
<b>Total</b>	<b>102</b>	<b>6 279</b>	<b>6 381</b>


<sup>a</sup> Including the Force Commander.

## Annex II

**United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti: countries providing civilian police officers and formed police units (as at 29 September 2005)**

<i>Country</i>	<i>Civilian police officers</i>	<i>Formed police units</i>	<i>Total</i>
Argentina	5	—	5
Benin	29	—	29
Bosnia and Herzegovina	10	—	10
Brazil	1	—	1
Burkina Faso	51	—	51
Cameroon	43	—	43
Canada <sup>a</sup>	80	—	80
Chad	19	—	19
Chile	11	—	11
China	9	125	134
Egypt	14	—	14
El Salvador	4	—	4
France	79	—	79
Ghana	26	—	26
Guinea	31	—	31
Jordan	7	287	294
Mali	13	—	13
Mauritius	2	—	2
Nepal	5	125	130
Niger	10	—	10
Nigeria	10	—	10
Pakistan	—	248	248
Philippines	19	—	19
Romania	5	—	5
Senegal	1	84	85
Sierra Leone	7	—	7
Spain	33	—	33
Sri Lanka	3	—	3
Togo	4	—	4
Turkey	9	—	9
United States of America	49	—	49
Uruguay	8	—	8
Yemen	2	—	2
Zambia	3	—	3
<b>Total</b>	<b>602</b>	<b>869</b>	<b>1 471</b>

<sup>a</sup> Including the Police Commissioner.



Department of Peacekeeping Operations  
Cartographic Section

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